This study explores the integration of cyber deception strategies specifically adaptive honeypots and decoy systems into military networks to bolster operational security and mislead adversaries. Employing a mixed-methods approach combining simulation-based experiments and case study analysis, the research designs a dynamic deception framework using open-source tools like Honeyd and modern decoy orchestration platforms. Datasets derived from hypothetical yet realistic military network traffic patterns, informed by declassified reports, were analyzed to evaluate deception efficacy. Key findings reveal that adaptive honeypots reduce successful intrusion rates by up to 68% and increase attacker dwell time by 145%, enabling better threat intelligence gathering. The framework demonstrates superior performance in misleading advanced persistent threats (APTs) compared to static defenses. Conclusions emphasize the necessity for real-time adaptability in deception tactics to counter evolving cyber threats in military contexts, offering actionable insights for network defenders.

Cyber Deception, Military Networks, Adaptive Honeypots, Decoy Systems, Operational Security, Cybersecurity Strategies, Attacker Misleading, Defense Mechanisms