DOI: 10.14704/nq.2018.16.12.1344

The Meaning and Significance of Dispute on Objectless Presentations

Vladimir Seliverstov

Abstract


This paper considers the evolution of understanding and the status of objectless presentations in the works of the three main authors of this tradition: “The Theory of Science” by B. Bolzano, “On Content and Object of Presentations” by K. Twardowski and “Intentional Objects” by E. Husserl. A critical analysis of these positions on objectless presentations is interesting, because here in one point, in one discussion, we have several very important philosophical theories that have had an impact on the philosophical debates in the twentieth century, particularly on the discussion Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell at the beginning of XX century. We want to show, how this Meinong’s conception has made significant contribution into the problem of nonexistent objects that still remains one of the most debated in contemporary philosophy. Here author aims to show how theory of objects as such came into being and how its main ideas were discussed and criticized in subsequent philosophical thought. This dispute pushes us to think that we deal here with fundamental ideological differences between these conceptions. Therefore, it allowed to consider another important philosophical and methodological problem - the problem of incommunicability between logical and psychological conceptions.

Keywords


Bolzano, Twardowski, Theory of Objects, Phenomenology, Objectless Presentations, Intentionality

References


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